Attitude towards the USSR

Adrenaline Дата публикации: 09-01-2023 8:00:00 Просмотров: 575

Now it is becoming clear to many that “the Russia that we have lost,” or rather, which we can lose, is not about 1913, it’s about 1991, it’s about today.

The attitude towards the USSR in public discussions is very reminiscent of peat smoldering in the depths - time passes, but the fire does not die out, sometimes bursting out.

Even now, it is noticeable to the naked eye that sociological surveys conducted by a variety of authoritative organizations, and even by a "foreign agent" - the Levada Center, steadfastly record the same assessment from the majority of Russian society:

1. “It WOULD BE BETTER IF EVERYTHING IN THE COUNTRY REMAINED AS IT WAS BEFORE 1985, BEFORE “Perestroika” (40-50% of those who agree over 25 years of annual observations, the figure for 2020 is 47%, according to the Levada Center)
2. The collapse of the Soviet Union is the result of the actions of politicians, not objective factors. 54% of Russians think so. (Public Opinion Foundation)
3. Returning to the discussion of the collapse of the USSR, the majority of Russians regret this event (70%), another 62% believe that it could have been avoided. (More details on the VTsIOM website:

Today it can be said without exaggeration that the attitude towards the USSR is the most pressing issue in the acute ideological struggle that is felt in many public discussions, even where the Soviet Union does not seem to be mentioned in vain.

The attitude of Russians to the Soviet way of life, which the ideologists of the 90s call “nostalgia”, “Soviet mythology”, cannot but cause concern among the ruling elite, therefore we are seeing several propaganda projects that seek to “debunk Soviet myths” and refute the public opinion recorded by sociologists that Soviet society was more socially just than today's.

Paradoxically, but in fact there is no “nostalgia for the USSR”, and the ideological rumors about the death of the USSR turned out to be greatly exaggerated.

If we talk about the Hamburg account, then the current Russian society in its value orientations, ideological principles and social attitudes remains the same Soviet as it was all the previous hundred years.

The fundamental values that form the basis of any society, be it Russian, American or European, do not change at all for centuries; only social revolutions of unprecedented scale, comparable to the Great French or the Great October, can influence them.

There was no such revolution in 1991, there was a classic coup d'état in which the main sections of society did not participate in any way.

In order to give this coup the character of a “revolution”, that part of the reborn Soviet elite that conceived this project launched an ideologeme about the “Soviet period” as some kind of anomaly in the historical development of Russia, a “dead end offshoot”.

They tried to convince the Soviet people with the help of a powerful wave of propaganda that the life of several generations was a mistake, and that now it is necessary either to return to the “Russia that we lost” or to become “part of the West” like the Baltic republics did.

It was from this ideological platform that the very man-made and criminal dissolution of the USSR was carried out; however, a dangerous contradiction was then discovered.

First, it turned out to be impossible to discredit such values as Victory in the Great Patriotic War; moreover, relying on this last fundamental stone, many other Soviet values that shape the attitude to social justice, to the family, to human relationships also survived.

Secondly, it turned out that there is a complete identity between these Soviet values and traditional, thousand-year-old Russian ones.

It suddenly became clear that “man to man is a friend, comrade and brother”, this is not only the norm of Soviet communist morality, but also one of the fundamental gospel truths on which Christianity rests, including Orthodoxy, which is the essence of the Russian national character.

Now it is becoming clear to many that “the Russia that we have lost,” or rather, which we can lose, is not about 1913, it’s about 1991, it’s about today.

It was not possible to construct any post-Soviet Russia, the institution of private property did not take shape in our country, which means that the entire system of social relations allegedly built on this basis is scenery, camouflage, plywood.

That is why we still have a huge gap of distrust between citizens and the state open, and it was not possible to build stable bridges across this gap even by annexing Crimea.

Today we are faced with a choice: if we continue to “fight Soviet myths”, if we remain on the same ideological platform, preaching “the USSR is dead” (and even Putin, who occupies centrist positions, prefers not to celebrate Great October in any way), then the collapse of Russia will be carried out according to the same scenario as the collapse of the USSR.

Russia (I emphasize - only Russia, and those of the post-Soviet republics that want to voluntarily join this) should proclaim itself the full-fledged successor of the USSR, and this is not in order to regain the lost territories - what fell from the cart is gone.

This must be done in order to correct the consequences of a criminal conspiracy within the country, to return to that type of social relations and to those principles of social justice that in the 1960s inspired not only Soviet people, but also a good half of the world.