In that distant Afghan war

In that distant Afghan war that began 38 years ago, we did not win, but we did not lose either. There was no task to conquer Afghanistan. Only, as it was then called, it was about the fulfillment of international duty.

In that distant Afghan war that began 38 years ago, we did not win, but we did not lose either.

There was no task to conquer Afghanistan. Only, as it was then called, it was about the fulfillment of international duty. Our army gained vast combat experience, which was then used, and is being used now. In Afghanistan, many Russian military leaders also took shape; in that war, the feat of soldiers and officers was born. And the memory remains.

On December 12, 1979, the leadership of the USSR decided to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan. And already on the morning of December 25, paratroopers of the 350th Guards paratrooper under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Georgy Shpak landed at the Kabul airfield.

Parts of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops were tasked with protecting important industrial enterprises and infrastructure facilities. It was supposed to release units of the Afghan army so that they could act more actively against the armed opposition detachments. However, the reality turned out to be much more complicated: our troops were forced to fight, and the Soviet Union was drawn into a real war that lasted almost 10 years. The losses of Soviet troops in the bloody Afghan war amounted to almost 15 thousand people.

The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was due to several objective reasons. Firstly, this is the provision of international assistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in solving internal problems. There was a danger that the Islamic opposition would come to power and, as a result, the armed struggle would be transferred to the territory of the Central Asian republics of the USSR.

Secondly, it was necessary to prevent the strengthening of the US and NATO on our southern borders, which were arming the Islamic opposition and wishing to transfer military operations to Central Asia. According to one Kuwaiti newspaper, the Mujahideen were trained by 844 Chinese specialists, 619 French, 289 American, 272 Pakistani, 56 German, 22 English. Among them were instructors from Belgium, Australia, Turkey, Spain, Italy and other countries. In fact, 55 states fought against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

Thirdly, another reason for bringing in the army is drug trafficking. Afghanistan occupied the second place in the world in the production of opium, which through the Central Asian republics came to Russian cities and to Europe.

It was impossible not to take into account the fact that Beijing was actively trying to play the Afghan card. It was impossible to allow the strengthening of China on our southern borders, which did a lot for the Islamic opposition. The USSR had a long border with China, which became a line of confrontation, and often a front line. Therefore, the leadership of the USSR did not want to lengthen this line.

Another important reason is the protection and continuation of the construction of national economy facilities. With the help of the USSR, more than 200 industrial facilities were built in Afghanistan, including a hydroelectric power station, a gas pipeline, airfields, a house-building plant, an asphalt concrete plant, a Salang highway and tunnel, and much more. A whole Soviet microdistrict was built in Kabul.

The inhabitants of the Central Asian republics certainly remember the constant attacks of bandits and terrorists on our outposts and border detachments, on collective farms with the aim of robbing and stealing livestock, capturing and taking our people into captivity, killing party workers.

In other words, there were plenty of reasons for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. Here it is appropriate to quote the words of the last commander of the 40th Army, Colonel-General Boris Gromov: “Entering Afghanistan was necessary for our country. This is not a personal whim of the Soviet leadership and not an adventure. It is impossible to consider the causes of this war in isolation from each other. They must be considered comprehensively, without prejudice, on the basis of documents and testimonies of the participants. With these reasons in mind, we ask ourselves, should the USSR sit back and let the Islamic opposition overthrow the pro-Soviet regime? And this despite the fact that the population of the three republics bordering Afghanistan professed Islam. The overthrow of the Soviet regime in favor of Islam was a dangerous example.”

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